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NOTES
INSTRUCTION TO JURY TO INSURE RACIAL IMPARTIALITY

Commeting on civil rights legislation during the post Civil War era,
Mr. Justice Bradley stated that the colored man may be receiving more
consideration through legislation than that given to the white man.' When
a man emerges from slavery, and, by the aid of legislation, shakes off the
inseparable concomitants of that state, there comes a time when he must
take the rank of a mere citizen, or a free man, and be protected only in
the same manner as other men are protected. 2 Is the Negro today still a
special subject of legislation and court protection? Must the legislatures
and courts forever provide special protection for the former slave and the
minority races? The courts have a duty to protect members of minority
groups, who must look to them for affirmative relief. Can this duty be
fulfilled by apprising the jury of the defendants' equality?
Just a hundred years ago, the Illinois Supreme Court in Campbell v.
People,3 held that a colored defendant, in a prosecution for murder, was
entitled to an instruction to the jury apprasing his equality with white men.
The evidence tended to show that a homicide had been committed in selfdefense. The defense requested this instruction:
"It is the duty of the jury to consider the prisoner's case as if
he were a white man, for the law is the same, there being no distinction in its principles in respect of color."
The instruction was refused below. The refusal of this instruction was
held to be reversible error, for, said the Supreme Court, as plain as the law
of equality may be, the defendant is entitled to have it declared to the
jury by the court.
The Civil War has been fought, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendents have been added to the Federal Constitution, and a
hundred years have elapsed since that early Illinois decision; and again that
Court in People v. Kirkendoll4 declared the allowance of an equality instruction to be the law. The defense, in a prosecution for rape, established
a nearly perfect alibi, with no contradictory evidence being offered. The
defense requested and was refused the following instruction which was
almost identical with that involved in the original Illinois case:
"It is the duty of the jury to consider the prisoner's case as if
he were a white man, for the law is the same as to both white
and colored men, there being no distinction in principle in respect to color."
The Court held that the defendant was entitled to this instruction, and
ordered a new trial. It would seem this instruction was necessary to balance the prejudice against the defendant, for, in the absence of the instruction, the verdict was clearly contrary to the evidence.
1. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883).
2. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
3. 16 Il1. 17, 61 Am. Dec. 49 (1854)

4. 415 Ill. 404, 114 N.E.2d 459 (1953).
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The issue has not been confined to Illinois, although cases from other
states are rare. The Georgia Supreme Court5 upheld the cautioning of a
jury "that the law knows no creed or condition, no color, no nationality";
and, in effect, the jury was instructed that every defendant, whether he be
rich or poor, high or low, should be tried with perfect impartiality. This
instruction may be preferred in form to the Illinois practice, since it does
not single out a particular race or class, although it be given with the
intent of overcoming prejudice against a colored defendant.
The acceptance of these instructions has not been adhered to by all
courts. They have been held to be argumentative, and to invade the
province of the jury. For example, the Supreme Court of Alabama in
Pope v. State6 considered that the following instruction was properly refused:
"The court charges the jury that they have a right in considering the evidence to take into consideration the traits, characteristics, and peculiarities of the white man and the negro man,
but outside of that they must not let their verdict be influenced
in the slightest degree by the fact that the deceased was a white
man and the accused a negro."
The instruction was held to be argumentative, giving "undue prominence"
to certain facts. Was the undue prominence in the instruction of greater
weight than the prejudice against the defendant would justify? There was
no comment upon the point during the course of the trial, and thus nothing
to give rise to the need for this instruction.
In Dolan v. State,7 an earlier Alabama case, where the question concerned liability of a white man for a crime against the person of a negro,
the following instruction was given on that point:
"... that it is just as much the duty of a jury to convict a white
man of the murder of a colored man as it would be the duty of the
jury to convict a colored man for the murder of a white man..
The giving of this instruction was allowed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. That court also allowed the following instruction regarding the
credibility of negro witnesses:
"Some argument has been made as to the color of the witnesses.
It is immaterial whether the witnesses were white or black, and,
if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that black witnesses are
telling the truth, it is as much your duty to convict upon their
evidence as though they were white."
Counsel for the defense had raised the question of credibility of colored
witnesses. The defendant was a white man, and all of the state's witnesses
were negroes. The law is well stated in the instruction that equal weight
is to be given to colored witnesses, as would be given to white witnesses.
5. Rrown v. State, 105 Ga. 40, 31 S.E. 557 (1898).
6. 168 Ala. 33, 53 So. 292 (1910).

7. 81 Ala. 11, 1 So. 707 (1887).

NOTES

This case was dsitinguished by the court in the Pope case; saying that, the
instructions in the Dolan case were given to counteract argument upon
the question of color, not arising in the Pope case.
The appraising of the gravity of the crime by a white man against a
negro, approved by the court in the Dolan case, points to the heart of the
equality problem. The instruction is necessary to curb the jury from
exercising prejudice against the colored race by excusing the white defendant, the same as an instruction is needed to curb a jury from giving
undue prominence to the fact that a defendant may be a colored man, in
determining his guilt. The only difference lies in the fact that in the
case of a white defendant the colored man is only indirectly affected. Nevertheless it is the prejudice against the colored man which must be overcome.
Credibility of a witness may be impeached in some jurisdictions on
account of religious views; 8 however, a witness cannot be discredited merely
because of his race or color.9 In the absence of stautory regulation, 10 race
or natonality is an immaterial factor in determining competency of witnesses." A Federal Court1 2 said that no witness is to be discredited merely
because of his color, and it upheld the trial court in giving the following
instruction:
"... both white men and Indians lie, and that the evidence of both
is entitled to the same credit, and such credibility is to be determined by the same rules of law ......
The court said that when coupled with a correct statement of the law as
to the jury's right to consider the intelligence, appearance, apparent candor,
opportunities of knowledge, etc., of each witness, the instruction is proper.
Most courts will not instruct a jury on matters not asserted during the
course of trial; but, if an instruction based on unasserted matters is not
misleading, it is not reversible error.1 3 To insure the availability of an
instruction of the type herein considered, it would be well to raise the point
during trial if possible. Perhaps it could be done during voir dire examation of jurors.
A search of the cases reveals a striking paucity of litigation involving
instructions of the type herein discussed' 4 Apparently such instructions are
8. 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses, sec. 675. p. 37.
9. Lodge v. State, 122 Ala. 97, 26 So. 210, 82 Am.St.Rep. 26 (1899).
10. Cf. Birmingham R. Light & P. Co. v. Jung, 11 Ala. 461, 49 So. 434, 18 Am.Cas. 557,
14 L.R.A. 581 (1909), holding that a state statute making persons of color incapable
of being witnesses except against each other is repugnant to the 14th Amendment.
Cf. Bowlin v. Com. 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5, 92 Am. Dec. 468 (1867), where the court
upheld a law rendering negroes and Indians incompetent as witnesses in cases of
the Commonwealth or in civil cases in which only negroes or Indians were parties.
11. 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses, sec. 158, p. 113.
12. Shelp et. al. v. U.S., 81 Fed. 694 (9th Cir. 1887).
13. Chester v. State, 216 Miss. 614, 63 So.2d 99 (1953) ; State v. Taylor, 236 N.C. 130, 71
S.E.2d 924 (1952); U.S. v. Jonikas, 197 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1952); cert. denied, 344 U.S.
877, 73 S.Ct. 172, 97 L.Ed. 679 (1952); People v. Harman, 110 CA 545, 243 P.2d 15

(1952).

14. A search of the form books carrying stock instructions to juries reveals only two
examples, which are found in Blashfield's Instructions to Juries, Dewit C. Blashfield,
3 vols. (Gallaghan & Co. 2d Ed. 1916).
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not being requested as a safeguard for defendants who belong to minority
races. When a colored man is on trial for a crime, his equality is guaranteed under the law; that fact is fundamental. For this reason the effectiveness of the instruction may be doubted. Granted that jurors do not
always decide cases according to the law given them, nevertheless there are
jurors who make an honest effort to follow the law as given to them by
the court in its instructions. On the whole it would seem that as a means
of overcoming prejudice, not only in cases of negro defendants and witnesses, but of other minority races and nationalities as well, such instructions
are likely to prove beneficial. The great weight of the authorities hereinabove discussed establish that the defendant is entitled to this instruction
as a matter of right. Perhaps lawyers should avail themselves of such instructions, in proper cases, much oftener than is the current practice.
LAWRENCE

SPECIAL APPEARANCE

A.

MARTY

TO PROTECT PROPERTY IN ATTACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

In an action against a non-resident defendant, begun by a preliminary
or concurrent attachment of the non-resident's property located within the
state, and where service is procurred by publication or by out of state
service, the court merely acquires jurisdiction over the attached property,'
and not over the person of the defendant. 2 It is generally held that the
non-resident may enter a special appearance to object to the court's jurisdiction over the attached property and still limit the liability of the defendant to an in rem judgment. 3 There is a split of authority on the effect
4
of an attack on the attachment on other bases than jurisdictional grounds.
The problem presented in this note goes one step further than this: can the
non-resident defendant appear specially, defend to the merits, and hence
not subject to personal liability, but rather limit recovery to the property
5
brought under the jurisdiction of the court by the preliminary attachment?
The leading cases holding that the defendant is an attachment action
1. This particular type of jurisdiction has commonly been called "quasi in rem", but is
referred to throughout this article as in rem jurisdiction because its effects and
character is typical of the in rem action.
2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed 565 (1877); Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185,
7 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed. 372 (1886); Clymore v. Williams, 77 IlL. 618 (1875); King v.
Vance, 46 Ind. 246 (1874); Epstein v. Salorgne, 6 Mo. App. 352 (1878); Robinson v.
Nat. Bank, 81 N.Y. 385 (1880); Bates v. Crow, 57 Miss. 676 (1880).
3. Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U.S. 31, 33 S.Ct. 694, 57 L.Ed. 1053 (1913) ; Davis v.
Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 217 U.S. 157, 30 S.Ct. 463, 54 L.Ed. 708, 27 L.R.A.
(NS) 823, 18 Ann. Cas. 907 (1909); Meyer v. Brooks, 29 Ore. 203, 44 P. 281, 54 Am.
St. Rep. 790 (1896); Adams v. Trepanier Lumber Co., 117 Ohio St. 298, 158 N.E.
541, 55 A.L.R. 1118 (1927); Chubbuck v. Cleveland, 37 MinD. 466, 35 N.W. 362, 5
Am. St. Rep. 864. Likewise in Tabor v. Baer, 107 W.Va. 594, 149 S.E. 675 (1929), a
motion to dismiss an attachment case, solely on the ground that no property was
attached and the order of publication was insufficient, constituted a special appearance.
5. For other articles on the same problem see: 18 Ford. L. Rev. 73 (1949); 97 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 403 (1949); 25 Iowa L. Rev. 329 (1940).

